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Australian general practice. Whether the new GP contract will
improve experiences and outcomes for patients, at a cost the NHS
can afford, remains to be seen. On the downside, many GPs
believe the wider healthcare service has not been able to accom-
modate the needs of patients in recent years; this may, despite the
best efforts of individual primary care teams, lead to a demoralised
workforce.
Towards the end of New Labour’s second term, the NHS is being
pulled in several directions — involving performance manage-
ment, quality payments, new contracts, and greater engagement
with the private sector, including American managed care organi-
sations. The competition and “constructive dissonance” of these
changes is very reminiscent of the Thatcher reforms. How general
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How general practice is funded in The Netherlands
Chris Van Weel
he strength of Dutch healthcare is that the general practi-
tioner’s role is enshrined in the primary care structure and
the personal listing of patients (Box).1,2 Primary care is
delivered through a personal working relationship with the patient
over time and the payment system reinforces this to some extent.
Capitation fee payment encourages delivery of care that is tailored
to individual needs, rewarding powerful primary care strategies
such as “watchful waiting” and the follow-up of the natural course
of signs and symptoms.3 It takes considerations of financial reward
out of the consultation.
The profession of general practice considers the capitation fee
payment as the prevailing frame of reference on which professional
standards of care are based. Healthcare policymakers’ attempts to
change capitation payment are usually resisted by the profession.
Although private insurance and fee-for-service might theoretically
invoke different professional behaviour, in practice there are few
differences in the care received by privately insured patients and
that received by those who are Sickfund-insured. In general, GPs
do not like fee-for-service payment, because it does not acknow-
ledge strategies such as “masterly inactivity”.3
Over the years, Dutch GPs have been jealously protecting
capitation payment and tried to exclude any financial biases that
might affect their performance. Allowances in the actual money
received have been made for the number of elderly and migrants
on the practice list, compensating for the extra burden of illness
and GP care needed. This has maintained relatively equal status
among Dutch practices and helped to strengthen the corporate
identity of GPs.
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How it works
• General practitioner payment is based on a two-tiered system 
depending on patients’ income:
• Capitation fee for Sickfund-insured patients (70% lowest 
income; in 2004, up to €32 600/year for people younger than 65 
years. As the insurance includes the period after retirement 
(“pensioners”), the cut-off income for people 65 years and older 
is €20 750/year.
• Fee-for-service payment by the 30% highest-income privately 
insured patients, who do not contribute to the Sickfund.
• Capitation fee is the payment a GP receives from the Sickfund for 
each patient on the practice list, regardless of whether the patient 
decides to consult the GP. Sickfunds pay the capitation fee out of 
the insurance contribution received from their insured members. 
This fee fully covers all GP services for that patient, including the 
GP’s income and a proportionate contribution for practice costs.
• The capitation fee is extended to family members who do not 
generate income of their own.
• Employee and employer pay 8% of the income for Sickfund 
contribution (1.25% by the employee, 6.75% by the employer).
• There is no direct government involvement.
• Key to access to general practice care is registration of the patient 
with the GP or practice, establishing continuity of care over time.
• For Sickfund-insured patients, registration is obligatory for 
access to care.
• For privately insured patients, registration is usually not 
required, but most patients do list with a practice and obtain 
care from the same GP or practice over time.
• Through registration with a GP, primary care remains the 
foundation of healthcare: patients receive their basic medical care 
through the GP and the primary care team, and specialist care is 
only available through referral by the GP.
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The most recent proposal by the Minister of Health to change
healthcare financing aims to introduce a form of patient copay-
ment for healthcare received, at 25% of GP costs for consultations,
and more for secondary care. The objective is to encourage
patients to take more responsibility for their own health and
consult less often. This proposal is still in its early stage of political
decision making, and it remains to be seen if it will be introduced.
If it is, it will be interesting to see whether this financial approach
rewards valued primary care approaches such as watchful waiting.
An alternative form of payment that has developed in recent
years is GPs in the salaried service of colleague GPs. Although
there has been a long tradition of locum services by young GPs
before selecting a practice of their own, more GPs now seem to
prefer salaried employment. This indicates dissatisfaction with the
combined role of both practitioner and practice manager. As a
consequence, practice has to be reorganised to make it more
attractive for younger GPs, and salaried employment may become
more prominent.
Disadvantages of the system
The trend towards salaried GPs highlights an obvious disadvantage
of capitation fee payment, which covers practice costs and GPs’
income at the same time, without conditions attached. For exam-
ple, the fee covers a full-time-equivalent practice assistant for a
standard practice, irrespective of actual hours of employment.
Thus, general practice was poorly prepared for the rapid increase
in female GPs, who prefer part-time, salaried positions to full-time,
private contractor status. The need for general practice to accom-
modate this change, together with the additional resources needed
to train more part-time GPs, is one of the factors leading to
increased GP costs.
Another disadvantage is that new developments in medicine
have to be included in the package covered by the capitation fee.
As a consequence, there are few (financial) incentives for GPs and
practices to innovate their care. This has particularly affected
proactive aspects of care such as illness prevention and high risk
screening, and investment in practice support (such as practice
assistants and nurses; providing technical equipment).
The package of care that the capitation fee should cover is
critical. This should be based on the effectiveness of diagnostic and
therapeutic interventions. In reality, the package has to flow with
the political and economic tides. For a long time, the level of the
capitation fee was fixed, irrespective of the patient’s health status.
In recent years, the fee has been increased for certain groups (eg,
the elderly), becoming an indirect incentive to provide more
proactive services (such as preventive home visits) for these
groups. However, this is as far as the system has come in
enhancing the capitation principle with financial stimuli.
Conclusion
Given the lack of financial incentives, it is surprising how strong
general practice care is. For a long time, hospital specialists were
paid on an item-for-service basis, in conjunction with GPs’
capitation fee. Yet, although this payment system did reward the
transfer of patients to secondary care, rates of GP prescribing and
referral in The Netherlands were among the lowest internation-
ally.1,4 Furthermore, more than 80% of Dutch practices are
computerised in the absence of direct financial support.5 This may
indicate that the payment system is not the sole determinant of GP
performance, and that corporate identity and healthcare structure
may also play a vital role.
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amily physicians (FPs) in Canada undergo specialised train-
ing, often in a Family Medicine Residency, and complete the
College of Family Physicians of Canada (CFPC) national
certification examination. Their payment is negotiated and admin-
istered separately by the 10 provincial governments and three
territorial governments, using different funding arrangements in
different settings. Under the Canada Health Act, provinces will be
financially penalised if they permit private billing by physicians or
copayments by provincially insured patients other than for certain
services funded by third parties, such as insurance medical
examinations, reports and travel services.
In 2001, FPs reported practising in private offices/clinics
(73.1%), community health centres (7.1%), emergency depart-
ments (6.7%), hospital in-patient units (3.3%), walk-in clinics
(3.1%), and family medicine teaching units (2.5%).1 National
surveys confirm that fee-for-service continues to be the main form
of remuneration for physician services (Box), with little apparent
change between 1997 and 2001.1
The drive towards alternative payment methods
Under the current healthcare system, 12% of Canadians (with
considerable geographical variation) report having unmet health-
care needs.2 Millions do not have access to an FP, and emergency
department waiting times are long. FPs have identified high levels
of dissatisfaction with current workloads and working conditions.1
Governments appear to believe that alternative funding arrange-
ments will address these problems and are the key to involving FPs
in primary healthcare reforms.2,3 Alternative payment approaches
combine fee-for-service, capitation (lump sum payment per
patient managed over a given period), salary, sessional and other
funding arrangements.4 Other, less common funding arrange-
F
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